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War Scare by Peter Pry
What is a book on nuclear war doing in introductory ethics? This is why: Plug several hundred million, if not a billion, casualties into an expected value equation and multiply that number by a low probability and you still end up with a horrible expected value. You won’t find controlled studies here. When it comes to nuclear war, all it takes is a horrible sample of one. Prior to the 1980s Soviet leaders had very strict control of Russian nuclear forces. That situation is gone.
These are strange times. The U.S. walks around on eggshells, yet gets blamed for the world’s problems. Other countries engage in nefarious activities, and few care. Sometimes it seems as if the primary goals of the U.S. military are killing the pawns of dictators and preventing U.S. military casualties. Civil defense, punishing evil dictators, preventing mass destruction, and undermining vile belief systems carry almost no weight.
Delivering a detailed historical argument, Peter Pry points out that most Americans have heard of the Cuban missile crises, but in the past two decades there have been numerous other close calls caused by Soviet alarmism. A Norwegian weather rocket launched in 1995, for example, sent Yeltsin scrambling for the nuclear button. Ordinary training exercises by NATO forces are perceived as great threats. Flight KAL 007 was believed to be a spy plane, and the Soviets believed that its destruction would send the U.S. into a remember Pearl
Harbor response.
Meanwhile, U.S. leaders of various stripes put out happy face spin for fear of offending Russian leaders. The President is unwilling to say, “What the hell is going on?” The image of security delivered by a politician at a podium matters more than actual security.
War buffs look at World War Two and wonder why we were so feckless and unprepared. They should be looking at the present and future. We are unprepared for events that have a far worse expected value than Japanese attack. We spend money on wrong things while ignoring major problems. From 1986 to 1990, the U.S. badly needed another reconnaissance satellite, but didn't have one because of the Challenger explosion.
The military prepares to fight two major conventional wars at once, not noticing that almost no one wants to fight a conventional war with the United States. Future wars are more likely to be unconventional. Yet Americans are pre-occupied with conventional weapons and a top gun mentality.
Pry’s title refers to the faulty belief held by the Russian military that a U.S. surprise attack is imminent. When nuclear forces are small, they can be destroyed by a first strike, and the probability of retaliation reduced, thus decreasing an important element of deterrence. One Russian big wig even bragged that Russian could “win” a nuclear war with fewer casualties than Russia suffered in World War II.
Pry argues that the Russians have about 1500 dispersed bunkers for its leaders and they continue to build new bunkers while Westerners remain oblivious, not to mention the facts that the Russians have a larger and better protected nuclear arsenal than the United States. Russian war plans continue to emphasize preparation to assassinate American leaders with suitcase bombs prior to launching a nuclear attack. U.S. Citizens and governments continue to do almost nothing, the main exception being U.S. intelligence officers. The National Intelligence Estimate maintains that the missile threat is "remote." The analysts closest to the problem were not allowed any contribution to the report. Weak conventional forces mean that Russia will rely on nuclear deterrence.
Leaders, from Hitler to Hussein, have shown great willingness to sacrifice their citizens while they hide in bunkers. Someone sitting in a bunker, who has contempt for his citizens might look at a war that killed 30 million Russians and 150 million Americans as a great victory, especially if they could get the rest of the world to submit to conquest and looting after the victory.
Pry argues that the relationship between nuclear safety and number of nuclear weapons is a U-shaped curve. If there were no such thing as nuclear weapons, we are safe from nuclear war. If the United States has enough weapons to survive an attack and launch large counter attacks, we are comparatively safer than if we have only a small number of nukes. Once the size of the U.S. arsenal goes below 3,500 warheads, we start heading toward the bottom of the U. He argues that the U.S. should not agree to any treaty that reduces the number of warheads below 3,500.
There are several reasons why having a small number of weapons is dangerous. First, most U.S. weapons may be destroyed in a first strike by an opponent and the ones remaining would be too few to inflict sufficient pain.
Nuclear wars become “winnable,” at least in the fantasies of generals holed up in secret bunkers. Second, opponents may have hidden, unverified weapons. The Soviet Union broke numerous treaties, including the treaty on biological weapons. There is too much at stake for blind trust. Third, Opponents cannot defeat, neutralize or accomplish much against conventional U.S. forces. In situations where greed, paranoia, nationalism, ideology or inadvertence has spiraled into an abyss an opponent may be tempted to think pushing a nuclear button will accomplish at least one goal.
The U.S should not even agree to nuclear parity with Russia. In a couple years the U.S population will be double that of Russia and the American population is much more concentrated in large cities. Imagine if Brazil were a nuclear threat to the United States. Would anyone agree to an equal number of warheads with Brazil? If Mongolia were a nuclear power, would we agree to parity with them? In the event of nuclear war U.S. citizens would be the biggest loser among losers. The Soviets, he argues, may have to cut their nuclear forces because they cannot afford the upkeep costs anyway. The U.S. should not reciprocate below 3,500 weapons.
The Soviet Union violated numerous treaties with the United States. Recent violations have allegedly included efforts to create new strains of plague, anthrax, smallpox and tularemia, as well as assisting Iraq's bioweapons program. A Soviet anthrax incident at Sverdlovsk killed who knows how many Russians. A nation that obeys treaties while other nations do not is a sucker. He writes that it is amazing how much anti-Western rhetoric eminates from top Russian officials even today. To those who say it is just talk, take a look at the historical record of "just talk" that ended up in mass murder. Various Russian leaders say the threat of mass murder is at least as great as it ever was.
The U.S. government refuses to tell its citizens that they should move to rural areas and build fallout shelters because: Doing so would antagonize Russians and increase their paranoia.
Politicians are easy marks for political distractions. We cannot base defense on how we wish other countries were.
There is no good reason why individuals should not act to protect themselves. American strategy in a nuclear war consists of random punishment. The issues of protecting U.S. citizens, of accurately targeting the punishment, the sufficiency of the punishment, of potentially losing a nuclear war have been neglected.
Citizens’ thoughts about life after a nuclear war mostly consist of slogans about life not being worth living. Funny, they do not say that after over one hundred million people died during the 20th century in other wars. Given the current state of American citizenship, U.S. survivors might resort to civil war or self-loathing or both.
One major weakness of this work is that is contains almost nothing for counterarguments. Often Pry’s mind reading of Russian motives is way off. Pry makes the hasty assumption that Russia will spiral into anarchy. Highly recommended.
Book review by J.T. Fournier.