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The New Behaviorism
by
John Staddon
John Staddon and the new behaviorists argue that free will or
any similar idea is irrelevant to moral responsibility. The new behaviorists
are consequentialists. If holding an individual responsible for her actions will
prevent five murders, she should be held responsible, even if she is merely the
sum of forces she has no control over. Neither predictability nor determinism is
opposed to responsibility. They demand it. You hold an individual at fault when you
have some idea what he or others will do next. Punishment is consequentially
pointless if you have no idea what individuals will do in the future. Punishing
a thief would have little more than retributive value because it would not have any affect on the
behavior of the thief or anyone else. It would not deter future crimes because
the thief would be no more likely to commit a crime than anyone else. And it would not influence others to be more or less likely to commit a crime.
Unlike the old behaviorists who were
mainly interested in rewards, the new behaviorists are seemingly open to almost anything
that produces desired results--reward, reasoning, punishment, propaganda.
The new behaviorism is not opposed to
mental life and the study of mental life. It simply believes that analyzing the
mental processes of humans is extremely, extremely difficult. Better to focus on
behavior. We are flawed, they argue, at knowing what is going on in our minds.
We do not remember well, and we remember things--false memories--that never
happened. Analyzing our motives is extremely difficult. Analyzing
someone else's is even harder. Scientists do not fully
understand the miniscule nervous systems of slugs, let alone humans.
The new behaviorism supports the use
of animal models despite their limitations. Like the old behaviorists, Staddon urges
us to constantly note environmental causes. Where the old behaviorists blame everything
on non-individual environments, the new behaviorists see assigning individual
blame as an integral part of the environment. If you teach an individual that she
can control herself, no matter how strong and violent her impulses, and she controls herself, she is part of the environment that other individuals live in, which influences their self-control.
Punishment is helpful, claims Staddon,
when it is quicker and more effective than other methods. It is better
than rewards at stopping unwanted actions.
Critics argue that bad behavior often
comes back when punishment is stopped. Staddon says bad behavior often comes
back when other methods are used also. He claims that when "avoidance schedule"
punishment is used, bad behavior is less likely to return. I remember reading
somewhere recently, however, that many good results credited to punishment and
bad results attributed to reward are due to regression to the mean. Good and
bad behaviors are both followed by more ordinary behaviors.
Others argue that punishment causes “counterattacks.”
Almost anything you do, however, can cause attacks. Hitler, Stalin, and
evil fanatics will concoct any reason to blame you and attack you--no matter
what you do, and no matter how ludicrous the reasons are.
Even rewards provoke attacks. Spoiled
children, callous celebrities, and dictators aggressive after being
appeased are examples of "counterattack." Counterattack depends more on the
beliefs, characteristics, and environmental history of the individual than current treatment or perceived slights.
Punishment is ineffective, writes Staddon,
when it is delayed, too soft, too harsh, or too improbable.
Staddon points out that psychologists are not the only behaviorists out there. Some of the best minds in media dominated societies are adept at one thing: Manipulation.
Staddon claims that believing in freedom is a form of freedom, though he errors by defining free will as feeling free.
Believing that deterministic forces are everything is itself a powerful force with great potential for destruction. Widespread beliefs in responsibility increase responsibility in an individual.
Staddon argues that it makes little difference to moral responsibility whether humans are completely deterministic or something else.
If holding people responsible is a part of a deterministic universe, it is a part
that leads to much better consequences than assuming that people cannot act
otherwise. Fatalism or a tragic sense of life has terrible consequences, no
matter what the truths about determinism are.
He makes the superb, important point that a good theory will often offer better practical applications than practical efforts using half-baked theories and technologies. In the 19th century those who worked out electromagnetic theories helped create our electrical society while those who tackled the practical matter of developing super steam engines hit dead ends or at least cul-de-sacs.
This work is useful for exploring behaviorist alternatives along with other alternatives. It is mostly a history and overview, not a detailed argument. Part of the material mentioned here appeared in Staddon's excellent Atlantic Monthly article a few years ago, back in the days when the Atlantic occasionally had good articles. Worth reading.
—book review article by J.T. Fournier
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